The Birkin Blog

Seduce my mind and you can have my body.

Uncensored October 25, 2008

Filed under: The Human Social Experiment — Colette @ 4:28 pm
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I am entirely too concerned with what other people think. Especially the people I care most about. I’m getting better at putting my thoughts out there and speaking my mind. But I always hold back, and yes it is strategic to think before one speaks but I find myself attempting to be agreeable. Not saying all of what I’m thinking or classifying and quantifying my statements. I really become what other people assume me to be at face value.

 

I became exactly what I hate most at dinner the other night. In one-on-one conversation I can redeem my reputation as an intellectual, opinionated woman. However, when in front of a group, I laugh and smile. At one point I think I flipped my hair. I embodied that stereotypical girl-woman who is there for decoration not conversation. Yes, I was the youngest member of this group. The other guests were all absolutely intimidating leaders in business, but instead of having the confidence to be myself and speak my mind I hid behind that ingénue façade and acted the part. Rather than being able to relate a story slowly, I rushed through it, didn’t even bother with comedic timing and did whatever it took to get the spotlight off of me. Instead of people seeing me for who I am or what I wish to be they saw me as a little girl.

 

I want a job, I want to be taken seriously and I am sabotaging myself. I had a prime opportunity to demonstrate how mature and competent I am and instead I threw it out the window. I became the flirt that commands no respect but grovels for attention. As if asking if the group would ignore how I had presented myself all evening. I had on a blazer, a turtleneck, and earrings that matched my necklace. Please keep in mind, I don’t accessorize well. I did everything I could to appear together and adult. Yet, the conversation turns to me and I am terrified. If I don’t freeze up and just hear my heart thudding in my ears, I say something stupid or make light in order to avoid saying something that garnishes displeasure. I am desperate for acceptance and approval.

 

Certainly there are times what behaviors are appropriate and inappropriate. This was an occasion in which I became exactly what I abhor, the stereotypical dolt. I’m sure if there was a tape of me talking I would judge it mercilessly. And maybe that’s my problem, I feel inadequate because I judge myself harshly. No one else has to say something to bring me down because I already feel as if I don’t belong, like a fool, and as if I need the consent of other people to quantify my personal worth. When I dress to go out I don’t wear what makes me comfortable. I wear what I think makes me fit in. Constantly driven to pass for whatever is most attractive to the people I am with or the place we are going. Probably the most devastating realization is that I don’t know myself.

 

I can’t be satisfied if I am not extraordinary and honestly I don’t feel as if I am. I feel rather mediocre and perhaps what is most stunning is that I am constantly comparing myself to others. Worried that I won’t meet some imaginary standard I have created. If something doesn’t work out, I assume it’s because of a personal failing. If I don’t have the job I want, I consider that other people know more about my ineptitude and therefore my position is completely justified. I am a door mat. And worse than that I do it to myself, no one polices me. No one has ever confronted me and said something derogatory or cruel. I have never been in a situation where someone else made me feel like an outsider. I have always been in the in crowd, yet making myself feel as if it were going to crumble. As if any second they would find out I’m not supposed to be here and kick me out. Take their friendship, camaraderie and leave. I have spent my whole life doing that to other people first. Judging and ganging up because they’re on the outside. Yet if people are not receptive to me, I take myself out of the situation before it can harm me. Or open me up for insult. It is a terrible way to live one’s life, constantly questioning their self worth.

 

Of course, to counteract this self pity cycle I make rash decisions to do whatever it is that scares me most. I will take that leap and put myself out there but only after I have found some loophole and some reason why I can get out at any time. I decide I don’t like a person, a group, or a lifestyle choice and therefore can justify removing myself from the situation. If we met, you would never think I am any of these things. I would be exactly the way you wanted me to be. And I am not ok with that.

 

Literature Review: Professional Psychology October 23, 2008

Topic: Social Perceptions & Attributions

 

Article: Effect of Arbitrarily Assigned Status Labels on Self-Perceptions and Social Perceptions: The Mere Position Effect

 

Citation: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1986. Vol. 50, No. 4, 684-689.

 

URL:http://journals.ohiolink.edu/ejc/pdf.cgi/Sande_Gerald_N.pdf?issn=00223514&issue=v50i0004&article=684_eoaaslosasp

 

Abstract: Subjects in unstructured triads worked on a group decision-making task and then were assigned to one of three status positions (supervisor, worker, or neutral-status observer) for a separate activity that was expected to occur 2 weeks later. The randomness of the assignment was made obvious to the subjects. Subjects’ subsequent assessments of the initial interaction revealed that (a) self-perceptions were unaffected by the status labels, (b) subjects perceived themselves as more leaderlike and more responsible for the group product than the other group members, and (c) observers and supervisors rated supervisors as more leaderlike than workers; in contrast, the workers’ social perceptions were not influenced by positional labels. The data suggest a relation between the self-perceptions and social perceptions of members of a status hierarchy and indicate when status labels will and will not influence evaluations. (By Author)

 

Discussion of Article: The article by Ellard, Ross and Sande explores how much of an impact an arbitrary title has on self perception and on individuals perceptions of others. Their findings indicate that,

 

“1. There was a consistent self-enhancement effect that was not influences by the positional label assigned to the rater.

2. Supervisor’s ratings of workers on the traits scales were susceptible to a labeling effect, although their self-ratings do not appear to have been affected.

3. The trait inferences and responsibility attributions made by the low-status members of the hierarchy (i.e. the worker) were not affected by the positional labels.

4. Observers consistently rated supervisors as more leaderlike than workers were” (685). 

 

This demonstrates the inconsistency of the belief that those that are in management positions are more qualified to lead or supervise than those that work for them. Despite the arbitrary method for choosing who should be in charge, supervisors were still believed to be more leaderlike than the workers. This demonstrates how restricting or limiting social perceptions can be as workers, who simply chose a different sheet of paper were seen as being less capable of leadership simple due to the title they were given. Supervisors were seen in a different light regardless of their personal attributions simply because they were associated with a leadership role and therefore stereotyped as qualified despite having no qualifications what-so-ever.

 

Relevance to Kreitner & Kiniki: This article relates to the reading as an example of how ones professional label can impact social perception. In K&K we learn, “The study of how people perceive one another has been labeled social cognition and social information processing” (KK 207). The authors of this article study how a professional title impacts the way a person is perceived, or more blatantly, how they are judged as qualified leaders or employees.

 

Judgment evaluations were evaluated in this study and confirm what K&K describe as self-fulfilling prophecy, “we strive to validate our perceptions of reality, no matter how faulty they may be” (KK 221). Which means that regardless of the qualifications of the individual because we have been socialized to believe that leaders and supervisors are more qualified we will find ways to see them as such. Psychology tells us that the mind is capable of observing and creating patterns in behavior. We see the patterns in behavior that we are expecting. We perceive someone to be a good employee because we like them or they fit the stereotypical mold of a successful leader, we chose to ignore that this person is only in the office three days a week and infrequently attends staff meetings. In the article the authors argue that, “the label may induce perceivers to think about the target in a particular way,” (685) or because someone has the title of supervisor they are a better leader.

 

K&K go on to analyze performance, “Research similarly has show that by raising instructors’ and manager’ expectations for individuals performing a wide variety of tasks, higher levels of achievement/ productivity can be obtained” (KK 222). This applies to the article by showing that it is possible that due to the title given to the supervisors they raised their activity or leadership capabilities to meet the standards they believe are expected of supervisors. It is also possible that workers de-emphasized their leaderlike skills in order to role play as a stereotypical employee.

 

Personal Experience: This chapter and article really hit home for me personally because I can see stereotypes, social information processing, and the Pygmalion effect in agencies across the state. For instance, every state agency in Ohio is run by a Director, Commissioner, or Chancellor. Individuals in these roles vary in backgrounds and experiences; however every single one of them has a female assistant. This fact may mean nothing, but it struck me as interesting that in the entire state of Ohio there isn’t a single male assistant to a Cabinet member. This can be attributed or interpreted various ways according to our reading. Perhaps no men have applied for these positions (which can also be interpreted on various levels) or the most qualified candidates have only been women. This fact could also be attributed to Sex-Role stereotypes that are applied to certain positions in an organization. It could also be a prime example of the Pygmalion Effect, these women are seen as members of a certain class and are therefore not promoted as frequently as their male counterparts. The expectation by their supervisors is that they will remain in their current roles and therefore these women do little to change careers. The role of the secretary or administrative assistant is not interpreted as a powerful position by society and exemplifies how limiting social perceptions and attributions can be in an organization that fails to recognize the prevalence of such policies.

 

Student Question: Can you describe a situation in your organization in which you or a co-worker were perceived inaccurately? How did you react to this situation? Did this impact your performance or reaction to the other person? Do you feel status labels are used to define success or potential in your office?

 

New Orleans: Organizational Behavior II October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:19 am
Tags: , ,

 

The first theory that can be applied to the second half of Jane O. Hansen’s article series, “Through Hell and High Water” in The Atlanta Journal- Constitution is the Trait Theory of Leadership. This theory argues that great leadership is, “developed through experience and learning”[1].  Leadership between Tulane and Charity is characterized primarily by Dr. Ben deBoisblanc of Charity Hospital and Mel Lagarde, the Hospital Corporation of America’s executive stationed at Tulane. Charity is an example of how this theory was not applied and could have helped the hospital to better deal with the crisis resulting from Hurricane Katrina. Tulane demonstrates how this theory can be successfully implemented when applied appropriately.

Dr. Ben DeBoisblanc was not trained for leadership. As a physician, Dr. Ben’s priority was the health and safety of his patients; not the successful organization of an evacuation. Dr. Ben demonstrates his preference for medicine over administration repeatedly. When offered the opportunity to have four of his sickest patients evacuated, “Dr. Ben consulted with other doctors: Which four should go first?”[2] Consultations are an important part of medical treatment, but not conducive to a swift evacuation. The time this process takes distracts from the executive decision that needs to be made, to get four patients to safety. Dr. Ben uses critical time to confer with his fellow physicians rather than depending on his knowledge base to make an educated decision quickly. Dr. Ben demonstrates, “Intelligence…self-confidence, [high] level of energy and activity”[3] however he fails to show, dominance…[or] task-relevant knowledge”[4]. His choice is the choice of a doctor, not a leader.  Later it is discovered, “When the owner of a Missouri-based helicopter company promised to send four helicopters for Charity’s sickest patients, Dr. Ben assumed those choppers would be dedicated to his hospital. But it wouldn’t work that way”[5]. Failing to make this clarification, Dr. Ben realizes too late that those helicopters have already left without his patients. His outrage and later outburst demonstrate Dr. Ben’s passion for the safety and wellbeing of his patients but do not emphasize his qualifications as a strong leader under stress.

The executive in charge of the evacuation at Tulane was Mel Lagarde. He clearly demonstrates the strong leadership qualities described in Trait Theory. Being able to focus on the organization and structure of the evacuation enabled Lagarde to separate himself from the patients in a way that Dr. Ben was not able to. “Dr. Ben was the passionate physician frantic to save his patients. Lagarde was the coolheaded corporate leader who had helped put in motion an effective rescue operation.”[6]  This distinction is exemplified in Lagarde’s calm control of the situation. He is in full possession of Kouzes and Posner’s most critical leadership traits, “honesty, forward-looking, inspiring, and competent”[7] he applies these qualities when directing the evacuation action for Tulane and Charity’s patients. Legarde,

 

“knew the physician [Dr. Ben] was desperate, and he understood why. He had gone down to the seventh-floor holding area and surveyed the scene of sick Charity patients lying on the floor. He’d ordered Tulane staff to find additional oxygen cylinders for patients who were running out. But Dr. Ben kept accusing him of not giving priority to Charity patients, of not understanding how ill they were.”[8]

 

This situation shows how Lagarde chose to act whereas Dr. Ben chose to talk. Though both men were very successful in their careers, it was Legarde’s job to be a leader, which gave him a competitive edge over Dr. Ben who is first and foremost, a doctor.

The second set of theories that can be applied to Charity and Tulane are, Situational Theories.  These theories, “Propose that leader styles should match the situation at hand.”[9]  Due to the lack of involvement or support from the government, Charity is not able to implement these theories in its evacuation, though they might have improved the hospital’s results. Tulane’s leadership is trained and prepared to meet with the demands of Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, Tulane is an appropriate example of the success that those appropriately qualified for emergency situations can have when the situation calls for their expertise. 

Charity lacked leadership from the government and, “More than 48 hours after losing their emergency power, Charity doctors had abandoned hope that the government would come”[10]. Without the much needed support from above, doctors and nurses were left to their own devices.  Charity staff had low situational control, no stable task structure, and in the crisis situation, absolutely no positional power. Lacking all of these tools of leadership as described in Fiedler’s Contingency Model,[11]  organization among Charity’s staff broke down. “Holland sympathized with the Charity staff. He knew they couldn’t see the whole picture.”[12] Limited foresight is one of the many shortcomings exposed as Charity’s leadership structure broke down. Dr. Ben was not trained to lead an evacuation or any major non-medical crisis.  His leadership style, which enabled him to excel in the operating room, limited his potential for success during the Hurricane.

Mel Lagarde was specifically trained and prepared for the situation in New Orleans, “he was comfortable as a leader. In the midst of crisis, his confidence inspired those around him.”[13]  Lagarde took control of the situation, as a task motivated leader he “focused on accomplishing goals.”[14] His method of leadership was precisely what his hospital demanded during Hurricane Katrina, “Tulane’s leaders considered it imperative to know where patients were going and had taken great pains to line up receiving hospitals. But Charity staff were at a different level of desperation. All they cared about was getting their patients out.”[15] Resolving this major concern demonstrates Lagarde’s ability to keep his wits about him under stress. Later his creativity in telling a subordinate, “The next time a government official tries to take one of our choppers…tell him this: I’m sorry, but you can’t do that. This aircraft has already been commandeered by someone else,” shows his ability to think dynamically to resolve issues. This further exemplifies how having a properly trained leader provides the greatest opportunity for the success of the endeavor.

The third theory that can be applied to the later half of “Through Hell and High Water” is, Path-Goal Theory which states, “Leader behaviors thus are expected to be acceptable when employees view them as a source of satisfaction or as paving the way to future satisfaction.”[16] The theory emphasizes how leadership can motivate employees and guide organizational action. “It (1) reduces roadblocks that interfere with goal accomplishment, (2) provides the guidance and support needed by employees, and (3) ties meaningful rewards to goal accomplishment.”[17]  The Path-Goal Theory of leadership effectiveness is not demonstrated by Charity hospital as well as it is by Tulane hospital during their evacuations.  Charity would have accomplished more of their goals effectively had they applied the Path-Goal Theory to their leadership.

Dr. Ben is unable to meet his own needs due to a lack of structure from the government, which is need two in Path-Goal Theory and therefore he is acting out of his own desperation. “You told me it was going to be 21 patients; you got 33, Montgomery said to Dr. Ben. I told you we’d take critically ill patients, and people who are ambulatory are coming over here.[18] Dr. Ben is pushing his limits, “the rejection was another reminder of his hospital’s second-class status.”[19] The rewards for this action are that he was able to get 12 extra patients to safety, however in the end it will be held against him and will limit his ability to evacuate more of his patients. Thereby failing all three of the variables expected of a strong leader in Path-Goal Theory. Eventually, Dr. Ben’s antics render him completely useless, “At the end of the day, when the doctor appeared on the roof with a bullhorn, Holland took it from him, then had him removed. Dr. Ben was escorted to the seventh floor, where a Tulane police officer blocked his return with an M-16.”[20] Without considering the contingency factors or “situational variables that cause one style of leadership to be more effective than another”[21] Dr. Ben put himself in a situation where he was completely ineffective. He is unprepared to lead in this situation and with the aggressive tactics that are necessary during medical treatment finds himself unable to lead or even assist his staff on the most basic levels in an administrative crisis.

Lagarde demonstrates his skill in guiding and directing Tulane Hospital by applying the Path-Goal Theory objectives in his leadership during Hurricane Katrina. “After talking to Dr. Ben, Holland directed the Charity physician to clear the evacuation plan with those in charge: Mel Lagarde…and Jim Montgomery, president of Tulane Hospital” (HH 43). Tulane has a clear delineation of power and an organized structure which meets need two of the Path-Goal Theory.

 

“Lagarde was responsible for the hundreds of people still inside the hospital. Tulane had requested security from the state command post in Baton Rouge, but there was not sign of the National Guard.

That night Lagarde made the decision to move everyone out of the hospital and into Tulane’s Saratoga Street parking garage. With fewer entrances and exits to secure, Tulane guards would have an easier time protecting them.”[22]

 

The foresight to first request the assistance of the National Guard and then to expedite the process of protecting those in his hospital when that assistance did not arrive meets needs one, two and three of the Path-Goal Theory. It meets path one by creating the safest environment possible for everyone in the hospital. It attains need two by giving direction and clear objectives to staff. This choice meets need three by providing safety to all personnel in a timely fashion, which is both a meaningful reward and a viable goal. Also important to note is, “through it all, he remained calm.”[23] Lagarde handled this situation skillfully and with poise rather than panicking and acting rashly as Dr. Ben did already. By utilizing the tactics described in Path-Goal Theory Lagarde was able to preserve and protect more lives while skillfully giving direction and leadership to both Tulane and Charity hospital’s in the end.



[1] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 512.

[2] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 11.

[3] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 513.

[4] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 513.

[5] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 12.

[6] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

[7] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 513.

[8] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

[9] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 519.

[10] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 15.

[11] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 519.

[12] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

[13] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 15.

[14] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 519.

[15] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 15.

[16] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 521.

[17] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 521.

[18] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

 

[19] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

[20] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 14.

[21] Kreitner, Robert and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. pp 521.

[22] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 16.

 

[23] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 16.

 

 

New Orleans: Organizational Behavior I October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:16 am
Tags: , , ,

The first theory that can be applied to the article series “Through Hell and High Water” by Jane O. Hansen is McGregor’s Theory Y. This theory is, “a modern and positive set of assumptions about people. McGregor believed that managers could accomplish more through others by viewing them as self-energized, committed, responsible, and creative beings”[1].  This theory was applied at Tulane hospital not at Charity. Had Theory Y been applied to Charity, their situation would have been improved greatly.

Charity, the public hospital, was left without the basic apparatus necessary to run. In Charity’s case, “There was no orchestrated plan to rescue them. You’re on your own[2]. Being unable to provide solutions to the problems within the building without support from the outside, rendered Charity helpless against the storm.  Had their employees been entrusted with greater freedoms by the organization, they would have been able to utilize and apply their talents efficiently to better meet their own basic needs and the needs of their patients. A proven example of their lack of freedom to take initiative is demonstrated by their refusal to act,

 

“Inside the hospital, an internal struggle was developing. Younger surgical physicians wanted to consolidate critically ill patients spread over four floors in different intensive care units onto one floor where doctors and nurses could care for them more efficiently. A committee of administrators, appointed before the storm by the hospital’s CEO, resisted. They believed the government would arrive any minute”[3].

 

Charity’s administrative staff chose to wait for direction from above, which unfortunately, never came. Had they been given the freedom to make choices within the hospital to better fit the needs of the doctors and patients in the middle of the disaster rather than relying on outside help, lives could have been saved. Rather than organizing the patients by need an illness as had been done at Tulane, Charity’s staff awaited direction from the government, “The public hospital, an institution for the needy, had to rely on the government for help and wound up stranded, as did so many of New Orleans’ poorest. For the sickest at Charity, the government never arrived”[4]. This shows a lack of direction and initiative. It is an example of a self-fulfilling prophecy and the Pygmalion effect because there was no expectation that employees break out of their traditional roles. Charity’s staff was expected to perform in a particular way that is all that was done, therefore no initiative was taken.

The hospital that best applied Theory Y was Tulane University Hospital and Clinic. As their employees prepared for the storm, they were given access to all the tools needed for survival and a successful evacuation. At Tulane, when the administration was notified of a need in the hospital, it was met as quickly and efficiently as possible. When in need of helicopters, “How many?” Bovender asked. ‘At least 20.’ ‘Get them’”[5] the request was met immediately. If Tulane had a need there was a support network available to work towards a solution or aid in its implementation. By giving their employees the necessary freedoms and resources as described in McGregor’s Theory Y, Tulane was able to ensure the success of it’s mission whereas Charity was incapable of creating a basic organizational structure or plan due to the limitations placed on its employees and the mistrust of the administration.

 

The second theory that can be applied to the stories of Charity and Tulane hospitals in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina is, Maslow’s Need Hierarchy Theory. Maslow’s theory proposes that, “motivation is a function of five basic needs; physiological, safety, love, esteem and self actualization”[6]. This is another example of a theory that was applied at Tulane hospital but was not at Charity. This theory could have improved the situation at Charity had the organization been structured differently. 

At Charity hospital the employees were degraded to a point where they were unable to meet their most basic needs rather than being able to pursue love, esteem or self actualization. “Demoralized, they carried the woman back up the outside staircase. They had failed to get even their most critical patient to safety. This is wrong, Sanborn thought. You have to come get these people. She didn’t even know whom she was talking to. But she knew they needed help from some higher power”[7]. Unable to find a rescue boat or charter some mode of transportation to remove patients and personnel from the hospital this young nurse feels she has no one to turn to. Speaking to some unknown, “higher power” and more to herself than to anyone else, this is a prime example of the lack of direction available to employees of Charity hospital.  Nurse Sanborn is willing to help others, wants to do what is right, but has not been given the necessary tools to facilitate an evacuation. The organizational structure is lacking in that she cannot report the situation to a superior officer and have that need met. Relying only on themselves, Charity’s staff deteriorates from a functioning hospital to a free for all, where even their most critical patients are not helped. Nurse Sanborn is motivated to preserve the lives of her patients, however according to Maslow’s Need Hierarchy she is barely able to meet her most basic physiological or safety needs. Without direction from the government, hospital employees were left with no structural support to enable them to get through this disaster on their own.

At Tulane hospital the employees were in an environment that encouraged their personal and professional growth. When someone capable of handling the situation arrived to take control, Tulane employees were prepared to sacrifice personal control of the situation to benefit the success of the whole mission. Their ability to do so without feeling threatened or as thought hey were losing control of the situation was due to the fact that they felt secure in their work environment. “By the end of the day, both in Nashville and in Tulane’s darkened command center, the guiding principles were clear: We’re not going to wait for the government to rescue us. We have to rely on ourselves. We won’t take no for an answer[8]. Tulane employees had their needs satisfied on all levels of Maslow’s Need Hierarchy. Physiological needs were met by the hospital, they were not required to bring their own food and water to work in order to survive the storm as Charity’s employees were asked to do. Their safety was protected at the hospital so fear of “looters and shooters”[9] was not a consideration in their minds. Love of their work enabled them to pull together to seek the best possible solutions to the problems Katrina presented. Esteem was granted to employees based on their talents and credentials, both the Associate Vice President of Operations and Division President of Tulane hospital reached their positions at a young age, which demonstrates Tulane’s willingness to recognize and reward professional accomplishment and talent. This in turn creates a positive work environment conducive to self actualization, which encourages employees to develop new methods and think outside the box. By applying these motivations to their work before and during Hurricane Katrina Tulane was able to preserve a sense of order and civility while saving as many lives as possible as the evacuation took place.

 

The third theory that can be applied to “Through Hell and High Water” is Herzberg’s Motivator-Hygiene Theory which predicts that “managers can motivate individuals by incorporating ‘motivators’ into an individual’s job”[10]. Herzberg argued that, “people are motivated when their needs for achievement, recognition, stimulating work, and advancement are satisfied”[11].  This was exemplified earlier by the advancement of employees at a young age in Tulane hospital.  Unfortunately this is another theory that was not best applied at Charity hospital that may have improved the outcome of their efforts to evacuated the hospital during Hurricane Katrina.

Charity, the public hospital did not apply Herzberg’s Motivator-Hygiene Theory. The theory explains that “the opposite of job satisfaction is not job dissatisfaction, but rather no job dissatisfaction”[12].  Charity depended on their employees to volunteer to work during Hurricane Katrina and required that they bring their own supplies of water and food from home to help them survive for three days. This demonstrates a lack of support from the administration. In an emergency situation the organization is already asking their employees to go beyond the call of duty, in a sense denying employees their basic rights to food and water. Demanding that employees supply these goods themselves, emphasizes a break in the system between what is good for the employee versus what that cost is to the organization.

This was not the case at the private hospital across the street. “At Tulane, administrators made routine preparations, taking inventory and deciding on staffing for their 178 patients”[13].  The administration formed a cohesive organized leadership group at this hospital which gave a feeling of support to Tulane’s employees. In this emergency Tulane’s employees were provided with the most basic feelings of support and safety within their hospital which enabled them to continue working. Even though conditions were strained due to the circumstances, Tulane employees did not feel as if their organization had abandoned them, a feeling all to familiar across the street at Charity.


[1] Kreitner, Robert  and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. Pp 8.

[2] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch 3.

[3] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 5.

[4] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 1.

 

[5] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 4.

[6] Kreitner, Robert  and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. Pp 237.

[7] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 3.

 

[8] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 4.

[9] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 4.

[10] Kreitner, Robert  and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. Pp 240.

[11] Kreitner, Robert  and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. Pp 241.

[12] Kreitner, Robert  and Angelo Kinicki. Organizational Behavior. 7. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007. Pp 241.

 

[13] Hansen, Jane O.. “Through Hell and High Water.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2006): 1-22. Ch. 1.

 

 

Public Administration vs. Political Process October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:13 am
Tags: ,

The role of public administrators in the political process has been described as “thrice removed from direct democracy” by Frederick Mosher, a leading public administration scholar.  The role of public administrators as non-elected, non-appointed officials provides them with a unique position in the political process. Public administrators strive to meet the needs of elected officials, political appointees, and the public by successfully managing public agencies.  In this role, public administrators also obtain a reasonable amount of power. The mechanisms devised to control this power are divided among the various branches of government. Though important to guide and supervise the work of public administrators, it is important to remember that too much regulation inhibits the bureaucracy’s ability to complete their work in the most effective manner.

Public administration has been referred to as the, “fourth” branch of government. As managers of public agencies, public administrators are responsible for facilitating and applying laws passed by the legislature. Government rules and regulations demand the existence of public administrators to manage government.  There exists a need to ensure that public administrators act in the public interest, as they posses significant influence. In recent political history, due in part to the increase in political regulation, public administrators have gained more authority than they traditionally have had in the past.

Bureaucratic power comes from varying internal and external factors.

“The internal sources of power are three: (1) knowledge – the information and expertise possessed by the agency; (2) cohesion – the commitment of the bureau’s personnel to the organization and its goals; and (3) leadership – The effectiveness of the agency chief in managing the agency.”[1]

 

Public administrators posses the specialized knowledge necessary to help politicians make decisions. As professional bureaucrats, public administrators are recognized as an invaluable resource of knowledge and agency history. “Complex policy problems can be solved only with technical expertise, giving an advantage to bureaus that possess technical knowledge.”[2] Public administrators draw their power from this knowledge base. Due to the nature of their positions, many public administrators have longstanding tenure that political appointees or elected officials do not share, this time in office generates a greater appreciation and understanding for how things work within an agency and in relation to the rest of government. “Day-to-day bureau operations provide administrators with insight into policy problems that cannot be gained from a casual inspection of program budgets once a year.”[3] Understanding how things work gives public administrators a competitive edge over elected and appointed officials. Therefore, methods of finding public administrators accountable have been implemented to audit and supervise their actions.

 

 

External power can stem from political support. Political endorsement depends on how visible an agency is to the general public, what an agency’s popular image is, and what public opinion of the agency is currently.  Meeting the needs of the public, the agency’s clientele, also determines the amount of power that exists within the bureaucracy. The more cohesion exists between the agency and their clientele, the more powerful the agency becomes. Ideal clientele should be widely disbursed and politically powerful. “The nature of politics in the United States blurs the distinction between political and administrative functions.”[4] If the agency has the support of key political elites, its ability to meet its own needs and the needs of its clientele is heightened as is the agency’s power. “Given the transitory nature of public opinion, a bureau is well advised to seek more reliable support to ensure its continued survival,”[5] without political support it is better for the agency to fade into the background than to appear negatively in the public eye. Public administrators posses and maintain this power on varying levels.

There are various control mechanisms in place to direct the power of public administrators. The Legislature exerts control over public administrators through the use of legislation, budgets, legislative veto and consultation, oversight, casework and informal contacts. “The veto is of crucial concern to Congress because it is a weapon not only for controlling the bureaucracy but also for checking the president.”[6] The Judiciary branch of government demonstrates their command by declaring particular administrative actions void. This is done when public administrators act outside of proper procedures or the judicial branch feels public administrators have acted inconsistently with the intent of legislation regulating their procedures. The executive branch of government utilizes their ability to make appointments, reorganize and exert staff control to manage the powers of public administrators. The executive branch also has the ability to exercise budget powers and leadership to guide the direction of administrative action. Citizens can also control public administrators by enlisting an ombudsman to speak on their behalf or by taking their concerns to local political leadership.

Though the three branches of government and citizens have various methods to control the actions of public administrators, much of their guidance depends on the ability to enforce these rules. “Congress and the president set priorities, and bureaucrats consider them but are granted sufficient discretion to make effective policy.”[7] Public administrators have the ability to decide which rules to implement and to determine to what extent they will apply those rules in their agency. Public administrators also have the ability to run parallel programs to counteract the agenda initiated by government. They have various opportunities to provide alternative sources of values and can directly challenge federal programs. These freedoms are necessary to ensure that government is run efficiently to effectively meet the needs of the people.

Public administrators exist to guarantee that the daily business of government is completed efficiently in an organized manner by the most qualified personnel, “No other institution can rival bureaucracy in its ability to perform the tasks of positive government.”[8] Working in this manner, public administrators have one goal, the successful operation of government to meet the needs of the citizens through their agency and field of expertise. “Congress may, to some extent, have allowed the bureaucracy to make law, it may also have devised a reasonably effective and noncostly way to articulate and promulgate its own legislative goals – a way that depends on the fire-alarm oversight system.”[9]  Overwhelmingly, the role of public administrators is to provide service to the public. This role predominantly attracts individuals interested in giving back to their community and their country. Career bureaucrats are motivated by the cohesion of public service and typically inspired by similar goals. By instituting methods of review and oversight that allow public administrators to complete their work with the least interference possible, government enhances the performance of its agencies as a whole.



[1] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[2] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[3] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[4] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[5] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[6] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Controlling the Bureaucracy: External Checks by Political Institutions.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 135-178).

[7] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[8] Meier, Kenneth J. and John Bohte. (2007). “Bureaucratic Power and its Causes.” Politics and the Bureaucracy: Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government, 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. (p. 42-74).

[9] McCubbins, Matthew D. and Thomas Schwartz. (1984). “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 165-179.

 

Public Policy: SCHIP October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:11 am
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SCHIP: Initiation and Implementation

SCHIP, the State Children’s Health Insurance Programs, was up for reauthorization in Congress in the fall of 2007.  Senators Hilary Rodham Clinton and Ted Kennedy proposed the bipartisan bill that would help expand the current program to include almost 6 million more of American’s uninsured children by 2012.  The SCHIP Reauthorization Act passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate but was vetoed by President Bush on October 3, 2007. Medicaid and SCHIP currently cover over thirty million low-income children and the parents in those states with expanded SCHIP programs, and some childless adults.  SCHIP was initially enacted in its current form by a bipartisan bill as part of the Balance Budget Act of 1997. It was initiated and developed to provide insurance coverage for low-income children who are not eligible for Medicaid. Research has discovered that two-thirds of the uninsured children in the United States are eligible under the current program. The expansion of SCHIP is supported by both Democrats and Republicans; it is recognized as an effective program to meet the needs of children from low-income backgrounds. In December 2007, Congress passed S 2499 which extended SCHIP through March 2009 and included additional funds to help states maintain current coverage levels. This extension fell short of the SCHIP reauthorization efforts which would have significantly increased SCHIP funding and reached nearly four million children who otherwise would have been uninsured. Issues around the income eligibility include; limits for coverage of children, crowd-out, the treatment of immigrants, parents and childless adults, as well as tobacco tax financing, and politics were the key stumbling blocks for more comprehensive efforts to reauthorize the program.

            The SCHIP bill gained its place on the Congressional agenda in 2007 because the current program was due to expire and was up for reauthorization. The expansion of the poverty percent line, which is outlined to increase to 300%, has likely come from the growing costs of medical insurance in recent years, and the inability of many American families to pay for such coverage.  The increase in the cost of medical insurance has grossly surpassed the increase in income for middle to low-income families. In fiscal year 2008 (FY2008) the Bush Administration reserved $5 billion over the next five years for the implementation of SCHIP.  This funding would fall short in covering those currently enrolled in the program, and failed to address expected increases in the number of enrolled children and families. According to Administration estimates, 5.6 million children would be enrolled in SCHIP after five years (in 2013). This is greater than baseline estimates of enrollment (3.3 million children in 2012) but less coverage than the 7.4 children that would be been covered under the CHIPRA bill that was vetoed by the President.[1] The need to expand the current program and increase funding is paramount to success.

Once the bill was presented in 2007, two versions were passed in Congress.  A compromise was reached between the two governing bodies and that version was given the President.  There are numerous differences in the House and Senate versions of the SCHIP bill that were passed.  Funding varies in both of the bills, the Senate proposed a $35 billion increase over five years, that would be funded through a sixty one cent increase in the tobacco tax.  The House SCHIP bill proposed a $47 billion increase over five years with funding from a forty-five cent increase in the tobacco tax and a cut in Medicaid and Medicare spending. Both the House and Senate proposed funding children’s healthcare via an increased tax on tobacco products. Tobacco companies have proven to be a significant challenge to overcome due to their strong government relationships, talented and experienced lobbyists, and extensive financial resources. Though Congress supports the expansion of SCHIP, this is predicated on the belief that the increased expense in tobacco products will not deter individuals from purchasing these items. It also assumes that there will be enough tobacco products purchased to finance a $35 billion dollar project. The resolution to fund SCHIP in this manner may have contributed to the President’s decision to veto these versions of the bill.

The SCHIP that was passed in both houses included:  a $35 billion increase over five years that would be funded through an increase in the tobacco tax. It will allow coverage for 5.8 million children by 2012, 66% of which would have otherwise been uninsured. States are given the flexibility to set eligibility for children but cannot expand beyond 300% of the poverty percent line. It allows coverage for pregnant woman and limits coverage for adults, terminating coverage for childless adults. Illegal and legal immigrants would no longer be covered, or the children of state employees.  A fiscal incentive to enroll children would be created. $100 million will be given to each state for outreach grant funding. It required that children must be uninsured to enroll in SCHIP. If a state expands beyond 300% they must submit a plan to prevent crowding out[2]. These specifications attempt to limit manipulation of the programs but allowed for necessary expansion for supported groups; low-income children and families.

To have legislation successfully passed there must be not only support from the public and the legislative body, but also from powerful special interest groups and lobbyists.  Key special interest groups other then the medical insurance companies were the American pediatric Association, American Medical Associations, American Hospital Association and even a number of labor unions.  External actors, private medical insurance companies, are interested in seeing this legislation passed because although a small amount of crowding out may occur, most states currently contract with private insurance companies to cover those enrolled under SCHIP and Medicaid.  If SCHIP was not reauthorized in 2007 these private insurance companies would lose out on billions of dollars because, although these families would no longer have coverage through public assistance, they could not afford to purchase private insurance.[3] According the Kaiser Family Foundation in 2004, eighteen of the two hundred twenty four possible plans were public plans.  They have also reported that the expansion of SCHIP remains the most cost effective means of insuring low-income children. 

The President vetoed the SCHIP reauthorization versions as passed by Congress. It is significant to note that the presidential veto of SCHIP’s reauthorization was done behind closed doors. This is unusual for the current Bush Administration, typically various media outlets and representatives are invited to observe and witness the President’s approval or veto. This action could be interpreted as an attempt to limit media attention and public reaction to the President acting against the clear support of his fellow elected officials.

Once SCHIP gained substantial support, the Bush Administration issued an executive order to the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare support to require that those states giving coverage to children beyond the poverty line by 250 percent meet five new requirements.  This executive order is a top down attempt by the executive office to control the ways in which SCHIP programs are implemented by the states. This authoritative action demonstrates the administration’s interest in the multitude of variables that affect how SCHIP is enacted.  In attempting to limit and make the problem more tractable the Bush Administration created further technical difficulties to allow individuals and states to access this funding. By limiting SCHIP funding, the Bush Administration aims to control the scope of the program. SCHIP as a program was created to help children, which are a significant target group in the population. Though not the majority, both children and the elderly are unable to fend for themselves and therefore have great power in policymaking. As dependants, children are seen as helpless and needy. They tend to be viewed with pity, especially children from low income backgrounds. By default they become the responsibility of the public sector necessitating; public schools, public healthcare, and general public assistance for survival. Low-income children and families do not have adequate resources to significantly impact the policymaking decisions of government. Therefore, their role as target populations, as defined in social construction, is highly symbolic in policy but elicits no real change because as a group they lack power. Thus, the Bush Administration used the executive order to pacify this group with a limited program, assuming these children and families would not protest or fight for the larger versions of the SCHIP bill supported by Congress.

The first of the five requirements in the executive order is to present a plan outlining what actions the state will take to prevent the substitution of private coverage and the issues of the crowding out. The concept of crowding out suggests that so many families take advantage of SCHIP programs that need based healthcare receives an overflow of participation that states cannot possibly accommodate. In the event that crowding out does occur, some families and children in greater need may be underserved. First and foremost it is important to recognize that there is no effective method for states to measure or track whether crowding out exists. In the event that it is reported that some families are affected in this way, the entire program will be penalized and those children that are already receiving the benefits of state medical insurance and care will no longer be supported.

The second requirement outlined in the Bush Administration’s executive order states that applicants must be uninsured for at least one year before a child could be eligible for coverage. This is both unsafe and unhealthy for children and families. Requiring that families not seek adequate health care insurance in order to later be covered by the state is a no-win situation.  If a family loses health insurance with a parent’s employment, requiring that family not seek private insurance should they need public aid later, is simply poor policy. This encourages reduced health standards and practices, which is an unreasonable resolution. In research performed by the Kaiser Foundation it was discovered that,

“for every one percentage point rise in the national unemployment rate:

• The number of uninsured in the country would grow by 1.1 million;

• Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment would increase by one million (600,000 children and 400,000 non-elderly adults);


• The enrollment increase in Medicaid and SCHIP would lead to $3.4 billion more in spending, of which $1.4 billion would be states’ obligation; and


• State General Fund revenue would drop by 3 to 4 percent, leading to state budget cuts with Medicaid spending a likely target since it is a substantial segment of state budgets.”[4]

 

 

It is irresponsible for government to compromise the health and wellbeing of low-income children and families by requiring that they not have health insurance for over a year before the state can provide the needed assistance. This policy demands that citizens living below the poverty level, not seek medical insurance guaranteeing that these individuals incur debt, remain in an impoverished state, and are potentially not healthful. Without good health it is impossible to attain gainful employment which families need in order to remove themselves from reliance on state assistance. This policy encourages and perpetuates a cycle of dependence on public aid.

The third requirement in the Bush Administration’s executive order is that at least 95 percent of children whose parents’ income is below the poverty line by 200 percent must be enrolled. This is an attempt to utilize regulation as a tool. States are forced to ensure community involvement in these programs but not provided with additional funding to complete the task, which they were provided  in the versions of the bill passed by Congress. Without increased funding, states do not have the time, resources, or manpower to seek out these families and solicit their participation in SCHIP programs. This requirement relies on public information as a tool but does not offer a method to facilitate its use. Though the FY09 budget requirement increases funding it does not provide the necessary resources to the states to meet increased need. The tools necessary to enroll 95 percent of families requires; resources, money, manpower, tools, and clear decision rules describing how work is to be completed. The executive order simply demands that work be accomplished; it does not specify or provide the necessary direction to structure how states proceed. Clear authority is given to the executive office but past that, no leadership structure or chain of command has been created. Decisive and clearly ranked objectives were described in the policy as passed in Congress. The President’s order demonstrates the ability of government to control variables in order to direct the course of policy implementation.

The executive order further demands that states guarantee that the number of children in the state with private insurance does not decrease by more than two percent. Not only is this unreasonable, it is impossible to execute, as states cannot control how and when families chose to leave or are removed from private insurance. For instance,

As the country faces another economic downturn, many states are scrambling to deal with the impact of poor economic conditions on programs, like Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), that are reliant on state funding. With over half of states forecasting budget deficits for the coming fiscal year, Medicaid and SCHIP are facing fiscal pressure at the same time as income and job loss cause more people to seek enrollment in these programs.”[5]

 

This further demonstrates how the demand that states ensure such a small decrease in participation in private health coverage is impractical at best. As states do not have control over whether families or private companies accept or provide health insurance, they cannot dictate involvement. This requirement implies that states have elements of control over private industry and private citizens that they do not. As a policy, the executive order encourages states to subvert government statute in order to implement SCHIP to best serve their communities.

Finally, the Bush Administration’s last constraint is that states have one year to comply with these requirements. With only “12 months to come into compliance with this directive. Twenty-three states are expected be directly affected by the new requirements (10 that already cover children with incomes above 250% FPL and 14 states that had authorized expansions beyond this level).[6] This last stipulation is both unrealistic and unreasonable. Giving states such a short period of time to research, develop, and execute these new additions to their implementation plans essentially encourages states not to adopt or expand SCHIP as necessary. The executive order, issued by President Bush in August 2007, clearly shows the Administration’s desire to control how the policy is implemented. 

Internal and external actors such as, special interest groups and those in Congress, have a greater effect on setting policy than civil servants and in some cases the executive office. Support from both Democrats and Republicans, the pharmaceutical and insurance companies, further demonstrates that SCHIP is not a single sided issue, both parties recognize the importance of this program and are seeking ways to pass and implement SCHIP successfully.  Both Democrat and Republican Congressional members have voted in support of this legislation. SCHIP affects low-income children in all fifty states.  It is understood to be a crucial program that must be expanded to better support needy children and families throughout the country.

The President released his Fiscal Year 2009 budget proposal in January 2008. The President’s plan would increase the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) funding by $19.7 billion over the next five years. 19.7 billion is more than the $5 billion included in his FY08 budget proposal, but less than the $35 billion included in the SCHIP reauthorization bills that were vetoed last year.[7] As the nation goes into fiscal year 2009 on July 1, it will be interesting to see how states choose to implement and how long the national funding proposed in the Bush Administration’s budget will last.



[1] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

[2] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

[3] Kaiser Foundation SCHIP brief overview 

[4] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

[5] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

[6] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

[7] The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation

 

Literature Review: Guerrilla Government October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:08 am
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Rosemary O’Leary addresses the role of public administrators in the policy and political process as knowledgeable and moral actors in a flawed system. In her book, The Ethics of Dissent: Managing Guerrilla Government O’Leary describes multiple examples of successful and unsuccessful attempts by public administrators to act in the public’s best interest (in the public administrator’s opinion) by working against the directives given by elected or appointed officials. She begins by defining Guerrilla Government as, “when employees work – sometimes quietly, sometimes not – against the wishes of their superiors.” The government guerrilla’s she interviews and describes in her book are public administrators that worked against the leadership in their agency or division at one point in time. O’Leary demonstrates examples of how public administrators have great power within their agencies to determine the outcome of events. The public administrator’s ability to work or subvert the initiatives of leadership (appointed, elected or otherwise) is the method through which they are best able to control the path of government. Public administrators use various methods to make their point however the central principal remains the same, public administrator’s do their work due to a sense of duty, responsibility and dedication to their field that leads them to act against government directives they feel are unjust or unfit to apply. The desire to preserve or uphold standards that are valued and central to their field is what drives public administrators to act in ways that are contrary to leadership. The drive to do the “right thing” is what separates these individuals from their private counterparts.

            In the book when public administrators disagree with existing policy they are able to act and react in various forms. These are described in course readings as; exit, voice, loyalty or neglect. Describing various cases of guerrilla government public administrators use their strengths such as tenure, knowledge and expertise to guide the course of government by working against the initiatives described by government leaders and elected officials.

            Rosemary O’Leary describes the public administrators in the book as being accountable to political officials but feeling and acting on their consciences. Valuing their personal understanding of their field these public administrators felt a great sense of obligation and loyalty to their field, fellow Americans, and to themselves rather than to the objectives of leadership. Public administrators described in The Ethics of Dissent feel that as charges of the public trust their duty is to do the best job that they are capable of, regardless of the direction they are receive in a top-down model. By acting contrarily to the directions of leadership these men and women seek to maintain the public good, by preserving, initiating, on continuing to work on projects and goals that were not agreed upon by their superiors, but that they felt were important to constituents.

            Whether the public administrator’s describe in the book behaved in an ethical manner is a debatable point. I argue that they behave in an absolutely ethical manner. Though public administrators have been referred to by Fredrick Mosher, a leading public administration scholar, as “thrice removed from direct democracy” these individuals demonstrate a powerful dedication and support of the public good. By focusing their expertise and knowledge on first confronting and explaining to their superiors the reality of the situation, continuing to educate though meeting with various road-blocks and doing their best to continue to provide the best service possible to both their offices, department and agencies these individuals demonstrate great moral strength and aptitude. In situations where elected government leaders refuse to acknowledge or listen to the information they are being provided by public administrators, it is with great hope that I would want the person most familiar and versed to make the call as to what is the best solution, approach and resolution to a public issue or concern. Meeting with adversarial feedback did not stop these employees from doing what they thought was best. I agree with the author that public service attracts individuals with a great sense of moral and ethical values as well as a desire to serve their fellow citizens. Being driven by these motives rather than by personal glory or a desire for re-election, these individuals have a vested personal interest in doing a good job and therefore would not act in ways that are rash or based on hidden motives. Therefore, I think their behavior as government guerilla’s is not un-ethical, but rather a reaction to greater unethical or uniformed action by elected officials. Though these men and women are working to subvert government leadership, their intentions are good and their ability and desire to do good far outweighs the negative impact of their work.

            In reaction to this book, I felt the most provocative example of guerrilla government was the story of Chiune Sugihara. The great political and social import of Sugihara’s life and work in World War II demonstrates the powerful impact that public administrator’s strive to have when doing their work. The business of government draws individuals of this character and personal moral strength, Sugihara’s vision to see what needed to be done and his personal strength do what he felt was necessary despite great opposition and even force from his government, exemplifies the positive outcomes possible when public administrator’s act in the public’s best interest rather than blindly following the directions they are given.  Though many individuals have the power to act in the public’s best interest, it is a power best implemented and applied by career public administrator’s familiar with their field and capable of judging whether guerrilla action is necessary or superfluous in situations of disagreement between public administrator’s and elected officials. Having read this book, I felt it is best described as a call to action of public administrator’s that felt their agency was not being led in the proper direction. Encouraging action on behalf of the public that may or may not know the impact that political figures are having on their lives, well-being and communities O’Leary seeks to preserve the public good.

 

Social Progress? October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:05 am
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                        Response: Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge

 

The main issue at the core of “Mayor Shell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge,” by Eileen Norton, J.D. and Thomas Weeks, Ph.D., is the significant number of homeless living on the streets of Seattle in the late nineties. The challenge became the ability of public administrators to actually facilitate his promise that, “there will be no homeless families with children or homeless single women on the streets of Seattle by Christmas 1998.”  Norton and Weeks explore the discrepancies between the optimistic ideal of eradicating these forms of homelessness in Seattle and the reality of initiating the programs necessary to meet this end. First, the history of homelessness in Seattle, the political background, and the social action taken to meet the needs of the homeless population are presented. Data collected from the city, county and areas surrounding the county are used to emphasize the various issues facing any program or individual wishing to change the way homelessness is dealt with in Seattle. Focus is then placed on the immense personal and professional differences between elected Mayor Paul Schell and Homeless Coordinator for the city and public administrator, Alan Painter. Finally, the limitations on the potential success of this project are described from Painter’s perspective.

In a top down model, implementation of Mayor Schell’s pledge is reliant on the work of public administrators such as Alan Painter.  Painter is described as “‘a good bureaucrat’ who knows how to make government work effectively.” A capable and tenured public administrator, Painter is familiar with the back-story of homelessness in Seattle and the efforts the will be necessary to aid in eliminating these specific forms of homelessness within the city.  Mayor Schell is described in a different light. Demonstrating, “a penchant for publicly testing partially developed ideas” with a “willingness to take risks” are a couple ways in which Shell’s lack of expertise is described.  “While he talked about housing affordability often during the campaign, homelessness was rarely mentioned.” The authors show that the Mayor is not familiar with the plight of the homeless in Seattle, nor is he suited to gauge the scope of this problem in order to make his pledge reasonable. Implementation of this proposal will, therefore, be reliant on the skills and performance of public administrators with little direction from the Mayor.

Regardless of the challenges facing the administration, efforts must be made to resolve the concerns of the Mayor and to at least attempt to meet the standards set in his Zero Homeless Family Pledge. The steps proposed by the King County Community Homelessness Advisory Committee to facilitate the eradication of homelessness were;

 

“to build a more regional, client-focused, coordinated network of homeless services. The strategies call for maintaining but not increasing the existing shelter capacity at this time…[to] allow additional resources to flow to other needed services and housing. It is vital that the community place attention on those housing and services that help people regain long-term stability and address the underlying causes of homelessness… be more proactive in preventing homelessness…[E]mphasize approaches that follow clients as they progress throughout the continuum of care…[D]irect resources toward sub-groups of the homeless who are underserved relative to others, including children in homeless families, single men and both youth and adults who are leaving institutional settings.”   

 

These noble goals could also be utilized to deliver Schell’s promise. The pledge is vague and does not give structure to the ways in which public administrators should address this goal.

The groundwork for resolving homelessness concerns in Seattle is dependant upon greater tractability of the problem. Technical difficulties include conflict between the Mayor’s promise and some of the “guiding strategies” proposed by the King County Community Homelessness Advisory Committee, costs of increasing shelter capacity, increased scrutiny of the homeless population and various outlying conditions over which the city can not control. Another major challenge is the hard resolution to have no homeless families or single women on the streets by Christmas. The absolute nature of this declaration makes it an unattainable goal, as there is no definitive way to assure it is met. Defining success in such a limited manner assures that this program will fail. Utilizing variations of this goal or applying a looser ending date may enable public administrators to create and implement a program that can reduce the number of families and single women living on the streets of Seattle but there is no possible way to officially eradicate these forms of homelessness.

With little guidance to give structure to the implementation process public administrators are left without; clearly ranked legal objectives, financial resources, hierarchical direction or integration, no clear leadership or decision makers to follow, rules, official commitment to objectives or the ability to access support or direction from outsiders. By making his pledge on June 2, 1998 and promising to end certain types of homelessness by Christmas, Schell only gives a start and an end date. He does not describe the methods, tools, resources or leadership direction that will or can be used to enact his promise.  “Seattle’s been extraordinarily successful in leveraging state and federal money for initiatives,’ Painter said, ‘Unfortunately, what we’ve all learned is that it takes a long time to get things done.” This information will impact the ability of the city to meet Schell’s deadline given the fact that they only will have six months to plan, prepare, and implement his pledge.

The other variables to consider in the implementation of this pledge include continued public support. The assistance given to homelessness included 7.8 million in services for homeless including emergency shelter and transitional housing, emergency food services, housing-related social services, and numerous tax levees to fund low income public housing. Having already committed public funds towards eliminating homelessness, constituents may not be willing to continue to endorse such a program. Especially when considering the immense levels of funding required for a short-term project with lasting repercussions that has no clear organizational structure. Constituency groups may reject this agenda due to the fact that it conflicts with some of the basic tenants previously designed by the Advisory Committee to meet the needs of Seattle’s homeless population. If Schell continues to make grand statements with little backing or research on which to found his claims, he may fall out of political favor. Therefore any program which he initiated my also fall under political fire and is at risk to be cut. Fortunately, the leadership skills and commitment of the implementing officials, such as Alan Painter may work towards Schell’s advantage to successfully meet this goal.

I would argue that it is first important to recognize that a public official should not make bold promises to constituents without being able to produce a plan to facilitate that pledge. However, that already being the case, the first step would be to locate resources. What programs and projects already exist, what work is currently underway towards this end, and who will the key players be in resolving this issue. I would utilize the preferred strategies described by the King County Community Homelessness Advisory Committee and work to ensure that funding exists to smooth the progress of these initiatives. Unfortunately, I believe it will be impossible to complete this project within the timeline suggested. However, work towards that end can begin which will progress to eventually decrease the number of families and single women living on the streets of Seattle.

 

National Agenda: Flu Vaccinations October 23, 2008

Filed under: Political Commentary — Colette @ 12:03 am
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                                    Response: Flu Vaccine Case Study

 

The Flu Vaccine Case Study discusses the problems with the processes used to manufacture, buy and distribute flu vaccinations to the American people from 2000 to 2005.  To begin with manufacturing, “The high-risk market, long-term exorbitant production costs, and low profit margins have reduced the number of vaccine manufactures in the US, From more than 25 companies 30 years ago to only five in 2003” (IOM 2003, 1). This has created an environment where there is little competition for companies producing flu vaccines which invites error in production. There are various examples of failure by the remaining drug companies. For example, in 2003-04, 87 Million of the vaccine doses produced had to be discarded as ineffective for the flu strain that year (Feeney 1). The author uses these results of poorly planned vaccine manufacturing to emphasize her point that past action has been inadequate to resolve the problem with flu vaccinations in the US.

Another concern with current flu vaccine policies is the expense to American economy. Flu vaccinations cost the US “between $11 and $18 billion each year (General Accounting Office 2001b, page 1) for a product that may not reach those most in need “The report’s primary concern was that there is ‘no system to ensure that high-risk people have priority when the supply of vaccine is short” (General Accounting Office 2001b, 3).  Another challenge is that government may procure an inadequate number of vaccine doses and they will go to waste. The flu strain changes each year which means that if the vaccinations are not used in one year they cannot be recycled for use the next year, they must be destroyed. This results in two extremes, too many vaccinations as described above or too few, in which case many high-risk patients will not have access to the vaccine to prevent future illness. “Health officials have warned about the fragile vaccine situation in the US for decades” (Cowley, 2005) which further emphasizes the inability of those supporting change in policy to get this issue on the national agenda. Since no resolution can be agreed upon without agenda approval first, this matter remains unresolved.

Finally, distribution fails to take into account a patients need, exposure or likelihood of contracting the flu.  “Distribution is based on type of health care provider, not on the level of risk among patients” (Feeney 3) therefore even though a person may be under two years of age, over 65 or in poor health, they may not receive the vaccine if they do not already have the accepted health insurance coverage. Feeney argues these flaws in public policy must be addressed if this ongoing situation is to be remedied.

It is first important to recognize and label the Flu Vaccine as a policy problem. The issue requires the attention of law makers as an important policy on public health and wellbeing. Flu vaccinations are a topic of rigorous discussion in the media as vaccines are important to a large portion of the United States population because the flu “causes approximately 36,000 deaths and 200,000 hospitalizations annually” (Feeney 1). Those that are most at risk are children under two and the elderly. Both of these groups hold great power in the eyes of the media as both are seen as defenseless by the general populace. Therefore, the media highlights this issue to remind law makers that policy needs to be changed, improved and applied as quickly as possible. In this case media pressure led to a number of swift and faulty conclusions but did instigate action on the part of policy makers. 

            By first acknowledging the problem, policy makers are preparing in the pre-decision phase to place flu on the national agenda.  Feeney argues that inadequate vaccination policy can no longer remain as a condition of society, with 90 million Americans at risk of contracting the flu, lack of proper vaccinations is not something that Americans are willing or can afford to suffer through.  With so many lives impacted by the flu, the target population is all US citizens; awareness is at its peak.  The media aids in tying individuals that may not think they are impacted to the collective problem. Which creates a feeling of proximity to the crisis; this is used to encourage citizens to push for a resolution. Media outlets exacerbate the issue to evoke recognition of the high incidence rate. If all Americans are impacted, the need for a better vaccination policy is apparent and therefore more likely to be answered by government officials. The dramatic numbers used in the case study further emphasize the need for proper policy development and implementation. 90 Million at risk each year, 36,000 deaths, 200,000 hospitalizations, 11-18 billion dollars a year; these numbers are used as metaphors to give size and scope to the problem. By using these measurements the author emphasizes her point that when vaccines fail to reach one group, they will fail to reach another, creating a “slippery slope” where the problem must be solved now. This is powerful propaganda for Feeney’s call to address the current problems with public health policy in the US. All people can agree that the problem needs a resolution; the exact solution is not yet defined. These are all examples of how the problem is defined by various political actors. Unfortunately, this is not a new problem and is neither sexy nor exciting which makes it difficult to gain recognition and to incite political action or attain a position on the national agenda.

There is a call for for better vaccination policy. Participants for putting flu vaccinations before the political audience are the media, the public, and the drug companies. Participants for setting the agenda are Congresspersons, the President, Presidential staff, and Congressional staff. Following the garbage can model ideas were thrown together by local, state and national governments to resolve the problems surrounding the distribution of flu vaccinations in America. Solutions applied on various levels of government include; redistributing doses intended for the military and other government employees to high-risk civilians, negotiating with foreign nations (Canada) to obtain more vaccine doses, denying flu shots to non-high-risk people to reserve stores for high-risk groups, creating a panel on the ethics of vaccine distribution and a summit between flu vaccine makers and nations, and stockpiling doest for uninsured or underinsured children. Determining that flu vaccines need to be at a lower cost, and they need to be widely available for distribution, policy makers are able to determine that the problem exists. The methods utilized to apply this knowledge were lacking as there is still no planned course of action for flu vaccinations for future years.

Agenda issues are chosen based on a number of factors such as political interest, social interest, and the national mood. Currently a policy window for sweeping action by those seeking to improve flu vaccination policy has not opened. The majority of the American populace experiences the flu and survives every year. Though the flu causes minor discomfort for a limited period of time it is not seen as an epidemic or disease requiring immediate national action. Though Feeney successfully emphasizes the cost and numerous shortcomings of this national program, it will be practically impossible to arouse the support needed to shift the flu to the top of the national agenda.

 

The definition of insanity October 22, 2008

Filed under: The Human Social Experiment — Colette @ 11:54 pm
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When he was around I became who I always wanted to be. I was my own most perfect version of myself, effortlessly, the moment he entered the room. Things about myself, I didn’t know I knew became an intricate part of my personality. I was beautiful and confident. Elegance glowed from my being for this man whose eyes searched my soul in a passing moment. I did not change but only came to full fruition. In that startling second when we made eye contact for the first time, I was alive. The moment transformed my world as none has since or before, the world that had always been upside-down, righted itself. The moment happened on a cold rainy day, not unlike today. Only today I am in such a different place.

 

I have been on my own for almost two years and I still miss him. I am wondering if I am missing him truly or if I am feeling my biological clock ticking. My friends are getting married and having children. I am 25 and for the first time in my life I am looking longingly at small children, babies, and families and wanting my own. I am clearly nesting. I have started thinking about buying my own place and finding somewhere new to settle down, I don’t want to do that alone. Thinking about the future I want someone to share my life. I make a point to take care of others. I feel like having someone who is fulfilling the same needs for me is important. Part of these personal changes have to do with me getting in touch with who I am and what parts of my life are not satisfying me.

 

Another part may be the emotional rush that this man brings me. But I am truly afraid that I am making this choice, to see him again, for the wrong reasons. I want to see him and yet seeing him terrifies me. I am afraid of what I want. Thinking about what I want versus what I think I should have. I think I am ready to be in love and be in this relationship. I just don’t want to hurt him or hurt myself in the process. Obviously, that is unavoidable if I chose to proceed and yet I know I’m going to do it. I know myself and I know this man. I realize that I cannot protect either of us and unfortunately we cannot be together the way we need to be for this to work. Yet we’re pushing the envelope. We are still going to go through this doomed adventure.